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EXHAUSTION OF INTRA-UNION REMEDIES
AND ACCESS TO PUBLIC TRIBUNALS UNDER
THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT
J. Ralph Beaird* and Mack Allen Player**
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 101(a)(4) of Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA)' guarantees to union members
the right to sue and the right to participate in administrative proceed-
ings.2 At the time the LMRDA was enacted this section received some-
what less scrutiny and legislative comment than did other provisions3
* Acting Dean and Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. B.S., 1949,
LL.B., 1951, University of Alabama; LL.M., 1953, The George Washington University.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B., 1963, Drury
College; J.D., 1965, University of Missouri; LL.M., 1972, The George Washington University.
I. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), 29
U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
2. LMRDA § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. §411(a)(4) (1970), provides:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action in
any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency, irrespective of whether or
not the labor organization or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in such
action or proceeding, or the right of any member of a labor organization to appear as a
witness in any judicial, administrative or legislative proceeding, or to petition any legislature
or to communicate with any legislator: Provided, That any such member may be required
to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time)
within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such
organization or any officer thereof: And provided further, That no interested employer or
employer association shall directly or indirectly finance, encourage, or participate in, except
as a party, any such action, proceeding, appearance, or petition.
3. In addition to the rights to sue and to participate in administrative proceedings, the section
secures for every union member: (1) equal rights and privileges within his union to nominate
candidates for union office, to vote in elections or referendums, and to attend union meetings,
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of the "Bill of Rights," 4 but since 1959 it has engendered as much
litigation as any of these provisions. 5 Most of this litigation has involved
the proviso to the section, which states that a "member may be required
to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-
month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal
or administrative" actions.'
An overriding issue has involved the determination of who pos-
sesses the power to require a union member to exhaust intra-union
remedies. More specifically, questions center around whether the clause
empowers courts and administrative agencies to dismiss any action filed
before expiration of the four-month period and whether it authorizes
unions to discipline members for resorting to extra-union remedies be-
fore four months have passed. Although the text of the proviso, when
considered in context, indicates that it is solely a grant of power to the
unions, the great majority of courts have concluded that it is a grant of
power to courts and administrative agencies as well. It should be noted,
however, that because courts and agencies have long been allowed to
dismiss actions by applying traditional common law exhaustion stand-
ards, 7 this ostensible grant of authority is not the most significant conse-
quence of the conclusion that the proviso applies to these judicial bodies.
Rather, the most important result of the majority rule is that courts and
agencies are now prohibited from dismissing actions brought after all
remedies available within the statutory four-month period have been
exhausted.
LMRDA § 101(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1970); (2) the rights of free speech and assembly,
LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(2) (1970); (3) freedom from arbitrary increases in dues,
initiation fees, and assessments, LMRDA § 101(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3) (1970); and (4) the
right to procedural due process in disciplinary proceedings within the union, LMRDA § 101(a)(5),
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1970). For a discussion of §§ 101(a)(1) & 101(a)(3), see Beaird, Some
Aspects of the LMRDA "Bill of Rights," 5 GA. L. REV. 661 (1971). For a discussion of
§ 101(a)(2), see Beaird & Player, Free Speech and the Landrum-Griffin Act, 25 ALA. L. REv. 577
(1973).
4. Rothman, Legislative History of the "Bill of Rights" for Union Members, 45 MINN. L.
REv. 199, 203 (1960). Title I, § 101 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1970), is commonly
known as the "Bill of Rights of Union Members." See, e.g., Beaird & Player, Free Speech and
the Landrum-Griffin Act, 25 ALA. L. REv. 577, 579 (1973); Rothman, supra at 200.
5. Compare, e.g., American Fed'n of Musicians v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171 (1964) ( 101(a)
(3)), Yanity v. Benware, 376 F.2d 197 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 874 (1967) (§ 101(a)(2)),
and Thompson v. New York Cent. R.R., 361 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1966) (@ 101(a)(5)), with, e.g., the
cases cited in notes 9-26 infra and accompanying text.
6. LMRDA § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(4) (1970). The section is quoted in full in note
2 supra.
7. See, e.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969); Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938); Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies,
48 YALE L.J. 981 (1939).
[Vol. 26:519
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Another important question presented by the clause has been
whether its directive is mandatory or discretionary; that is, must the
courts and agencies demand exhaustion in every case or is the require-
ment a flexible one to be imposed in the discretion of the court or agency
hearing the suit. Today the majority of courts hold that the exhaustion
proviso of subsection (a)(4) is discretionary in nature. Moreover, the
courts have even established a number of specific exceptions to the
requirement.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the case law since 1959 in
an effort to trace thd developments outlined above. Part II will examine
the debate with respect to whether the unions or the courts have the
power to require exhaustion. Part III will consider the discretionary
nature of the exhaustion requirement and the exceptions to it.
II. THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT
Based solely on the text of section 101(a)(4), one could make a
strong argument that the proviso does not apply to courts and adminis-
trative agencies. In the first place, the clause's proscription of limita-
tions on the right to sue is specifically directed to "labor organizations,"
and to labor organizations only.' Thus, it seems reasonable to assume
that the phrase "may be required" in the proviso applies only to labor
organizations also. Furthermore, had Congress intended that the pro-
viso apply to courts and administrative agencies, the proviso could have
been phrased "courts and/or agencies may require plaintiffs . . ." or
in words of similar import.
In spite of such arguments, however, in the landmark decision of
Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists,9 the Second Circuit con-
strued the proviso as applying to courts. There, after negotiation failed
to settle a dispute between a union member and his employer, the union
requested that the parties submit to arbitration. The arbitrators ruled
against the union member and, upon his failure to abide by the award,
the union placed him on its "National Unfair List," which prevented
agents from booking him for employment. He then brought suit for
injunctive relief and damages, arguing that the union's discipline vio-
lated the procedural rights guaranteed him by section 101(a)(5) of
LMRDA.10 The district court had dismissed the action because of the
8. See note 2 supra.
9. 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(5) (1970). This subsection provides for the right to procedural due
process in disciplinary proceedings within the union. See id.
1974]
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member's failure to exhaust intra-union remedies." The Second Circuit
reversed, holding that under the facts of the case exhaustion was not
required.' 2 For our purposes, however, the decision is significant because
the court made it clear that the exhaustion proviso applies to courts and
agencies:
[1]t appears clear that the proviso was incorporated in order to preserve
the exhaustion doctrine as it had developed and would continue to develop
in the courts, lest it otherwise appear to be Congress' intention to have
the right to sue secured by § 101 abrograte the requirement of prior resort
to internal procedures. . . . We therefore construe the statute to mean
that a member of a labor union who attempts to institute proceedings
before a court or an administrative agency may be required by that court
or agency to exhaust internal remedies of less than four months' duration
before invoking outside assistance. 3
Although some decisions since Detroy have disagreed with the
court's conclusion that the exhaustion proviso applies to courts and
administrative agencies, 4 the overwhelming majority of courts have
followed it. 5 Moreover, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Industrial
Union of Marine Workers" reached an identical conclusion. In Marine
Workers, a union member filed an unfair labor practice charge against
his union with the National Labor Relations Board. While the charge
was pending, the union began internal disciplinary proceedings against
the member for violation of a provision of the union constitution which
II. Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 189 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd,
286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961).
12. The court said:
Taking due account of the declared policy favoring self-regulation by unions, we none-
theless hold that where the internal union remedy is uncertain and has not been specifically
brought to the attention of the disciplined party, the violation of federal law clear and
undisputed, and the injury to the union member immediate and difficult to compensate by
means of a subsequent money award, exhaustion of union remedies ought not to be required.
The absence of any of these elements might, in light of Congressional approval of the
exhaustion doctrine, call for a different result. The facts of this case, however, warrant
immediate judicial intervention.
286 F.2d at 81.
13. Id. at 78 (emphasis in original).
14. E.g., Mamula v. United Steelworkers, 414 Pa. 294, 200 A.2d 306 (4-3 decision), appeal
dismissed, 379 U.S. 17 (1964).
15. E.g., Fulton Lodge No. 2, IAM v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1969); Giordani v.
Upholsterers Union, 403 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1968); Foy v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 377 F.2d 243 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 848 (1967); see Farowitz v. Musicians Local 802, 330 F.2d 999 (2d
Cir. 1964); cf. Harris v. Longshoremen's Local 1291, 321 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1963).
16. 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
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required a member to exhaust all intra-union remedies and appeals
before resorting to any court or other extra-union tribunal. After the
member had been found guilty and expelled from the union, he filed a
second charge with the Board alleging that his expulsion for filing the
first charge was unlawful. The Board had found his expulsion a violation
of section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act 17 and had
issued a remedial order.18 Relying on the proviso to section 101(a)(4) of
the LMRDA, however, the court of appeals had refused to enforce the
order. 9
To avoid the pJioviso's impact, the Board had argued that the pro-
viso empowered the Board, rather than any labor organization, to re-
quire exhaustion of reasonable intra-union procedures. 0 The court of
appeals felt that this conclusion, in effect the same as that reached by
the Detroy court,2 was "surprising. ' 2 2 The court further determined
that such a construction did "violence to the structure and sense of
section 101.1123 The court interpreted the proviso as empowering the
unions, not courts or agencies, to require members to "'devote not more
than four months to reasonable grievance procedures within the organi-
zation.' ",24 The Supreme Court explicitly rejected this interpretation of
the proviso:
We conclude that "may be required" is not a grant of authority to unions
more firmly to police their members but a statement of policy that the
public tribunals whose aid is invoked may in their discretion stay their
hands for four months, while the aggrieved person seeks relief within the
union.2
It might be argued that the Detroy court's finding that the exhaus-
tion proviso applies to the courts, and the subsequent adoption by the
Supreme Court of this rule in Marine Workers, precludes union disci-
pline against a member who fails to exhaust intra-union remedies. The
decisions with respect to this point, however, show that agreement with
the Detroy-Marine Workers interpretation of the proviso has not neces-
17. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1970).
18. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 159 N.L.R.B. 1065 (1966).
19. Industrial Union of Marine Workers v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1967).
20. Id. at 708.
21. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
22. 379 F.2d at 708.
23. Id.
24. Id., quoting Sheridan v. Carpenters Local 626, 306 F.2d 152, 160 (3d Cir. 1962) (concur-
ring opinion).
25. 391 U.S. at 426.
1974]
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sarily meant that all union discipline is prohibited.
In the case of McCraw v. United Association of Plumbing," for
example, McCraw, having unsuccessfully filed internal union charges
against the local's business agent, filed an unfair labor practice charge
against the local itself with the National Labor Relations Board. The
Board declined to issue a complaint. Subsequently, the business agent
filed charges with the local alleging that McCraw had violated the union
constitution by going to the Board before exhausting union remedies.
McCraw was found guilty and fined, and the punishment was affirmed
on appeal to the executive board of the union. McCraw then filed an
appeal to the general convention of the international union, but it was
not scheduled to meet for five years. As an added exacerbation, shortly
after McCraw had filed his first internal appeal, he was suspended from
the union for non-payment of union dues.Y Five months after his sus-
pension, he brought an action in federal district court,28 alleging, inter
alia, that the fine and suspension were illegal. The district court, holding
that imposition of the fine violated section 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA,
set it aside and ordered the union to reinstate McCraw upon his pay-
ment of current dues.29
In reference to the exhaustion issue, the Sixth Circuit first consid-
ered whether the district court had improperly assumed jurisdiction over
McCraw's claim in light of the subsection 101(a)(4) proviso.3 By
adopting this approach the court impliedly recognized that the exhaus-
tion proviso does apply to the courts, and that if McCraw had failed to
exhaust intra-union remedies, the district court should have dismissed
the action. The court, however, accepted the district court's conclusion
that McCraw had exhausted his available remedies, and thus concluded
that jurisdiction existed.3' More significantly, the McCraw court recog-
nized that the exhaustion proviso authorizes union discipline. The court
stated, "The statute does permit. . . a requirement that a union mem-
ber exhaust reasonable hearing procedures, not exceeding four months
lapse of time, before resorting to court action. In keeping with this
permission, [the union constitution] requires an exhaustion of available
26. 341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965).
27. McCraw had continued to tender his dues throughout the controversy. Since McCraw
refused to pay the fine, however, the union would not accept them. Id. at 708.
28. McCraw v. United Ass'n of Plumbing, 216 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
29. Id. at 662, 664.
30. 341 F.2d at 711.
31. Id.
[Vol. 26:519
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remedies within the union. ' '32 It was only because McCraw had com-
plied with this requirement that the discipline was invalid.- The neces-
sary implication is that, had McCraw not complied with the union
constitution, the punishment would have been allowed.
A case reaching the opposite conclusion is Roberts v. NLRB, 34
where a union member was fined by his union for filing charges with
the National Labor Relations Board without having previously ex-
hausted his internal union remedies. The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia enforced the Board's order finding that the union's
imposition of the fine constituted an unfair labor practice. 5 In inter-
preting the proviso to section 101 (a)(4), the court concluded that it did
"not legalize a coercive fine imposed upon a member by a labor organi-
zation for his failure to exhaust internal remedies for four months before
filing an unfair labor practice charge against his union." 3 The court
further recognized that:
The proviso does authorize indeed it may require, the agency or court to
which the member comes for relief to withhold the exercise of its author-
ity-for four months if reasonable internal procedures are available and
are not earlier exhausted-in deference to the congressional desire that a
solution be reached by means other than at the hands of public authori-
ties."
The court concluded, however, that "[a]pproval of such restraint by
agency or court is quite different . . . from freeing the Union itself to
impose a fine for failure of a member to exhaust such procedures. ' 3 8
A similar holding was reached in Ryan v. IBEW.39 In Ryan three
local union officers were expelled because they brought suit to enjoin
arbitration of a dispute in the belief that the existing collective bargain-
ing agreement did not require their local to submit to arbitration. The
union argued that the discipline was justified because the three officials
had violated the union constitution, which stated, in substance, that any
member who resorted to the courts for redress before exhausting intra-
union remedies would be automatically expelled. Interpreting the phrase
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965).




39. 361 F.2d 942 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966).
1974]
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"may be required" in the proviso to section 101(a)(4)" as implying that
in some circumstances suit could be brought prior to the expiration of
four months, the district court41 had concluded that these justifying
circumstances could be determined only by bringing suit to determine
whether the court would accept jurisdiction over the controversy. Conse-
quently, the district court had held that automatic expulsion for bringing
suit was arbitrary and invalid.42
On appeal, the union contended that it had the right to expel a
member should a court determine that the suit was not exceptional, that
'is, that exhaustion should be required.43 The Seventh Circuit rejected
this argument:
This claim of the Union . . . makes a member's bringing of a suit.
too chancy a gamble for the member and effectually blocks access to the
courts by placing the member in the dilemma of swallowing the grievance
about which he wishes to sue. . . or suing upon the speculation that he
will be safe from expulsion by the court's discretion being exercised in
his favor.
. . . The right of free access to our courts is too precious a right to
be curbed by the risky prediction that the judge's discretion may, like a
lucky roll of dice, turn up in favor of the suitor."
The Roberts and Ryan decisions indicate that the interpretation
given to the exhaustion proviso by the McCraw court is incorrect. Any
remaining doubt should have been resolved by the Supreme Court's
decision in NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers.45 As pre-
viously noted,4" there the Court explicitly concluded that the proviso was
not "a grant of authority to unions more firmly to police their mem-
bers."4' 7
It should be pointed out, however, that other language in the
Marine Workers case appears to limit this holding. At the close of the
opinion the Court noted that where the complaint or grievance did not
concern an internal union matter, but touched a part of.the public
40. "Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing proce-
dures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) . LMRDA § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C.
§ 41 l(a)(4) (1970).
41. Ryan v. IBEW, 241 F. Supp. 489 (N.D. II. 1965).
42. Id. at 493.
43. See 361 F.2d at 945.
44. Id. at 946.
45. 391 U.S. 418 (1968). See generally notes 16-25 supra and accompanying text.
46. See notes 16-25 supra and accompanying text.
47. 391 U.S. at 426.
[Vol. 26:519
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domain covered by the National Labor Relations Act, failure to resort
to intra-union grievance procedures was not a ground for expulsion.48
By negative implication this statement could be interpreted as meaning
that the proviso to section 101(a)(4) authorizes unions to discipline
members if the alleged grievance concerns internal union matters rather
than matters which are part of the public domain. Mr. Justice Harlan,
in his concurring opinion, interpreted the majority's language in this
fashion and criticized the majority for creating such a "dichotomy. 4
It is submitted, however, that this is not the proper interpretation of the
majority's language.
In the first place, such a reading is logically inconsistent. Since
earlier in the opinion the Court had specifically stated that the proviso
was "not a grant of authority to unions' 50 at all, but was a statement
of policy directed to public tribunals," the argument that the proviso
authorizes unions to discipline members is without merit. An even
stronger refutation of such an interpretation is evinced by a close analy-
sis of the majority opinion. When the majority made the statement in
question it was not even referring to the exhaustion proviso of section
101(a)(4). Rather, the Court was alluding to its earlier discussion 2 of
the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act
which preserves to unions "[tihe right . . . to prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein. . .. '53 It was in this section of the opinion that the Court
made the distinction between the internal affairs of a union and matters
in the public domain and discussed the effect of this distinction upon a
union's disciplinary powers.54 Consequently, to import the distinction
into the discussion of section 101(a)(4) is to apply it completely out of
context.
The broader reading of the Marine Workers case, that is, that it
established a rule prohibiting union discipline of a member who initiates
48. Id. at 428.
49. .1d. at 429 (Harlan, J., concurring):
Assuming arguendo that there are member-union grievances untouched by the various
federal labor statutes, this dichotomy has. . . precisely the disadvantage that the court has
found in the third circuit's construction of the proviso: it compels a member to gamble his
union membership, and often his employment, on the accuracy of his understanding of the
federal labor laws.
50. Id. at 426.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 422-25.
53. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1970).
54. 391 U.S. at 423-25.
1974]
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"public tribunal" action without spending at least four months in the
exhaustion of the union's internal hearing procedures, was adopted as
a holding by the Ninth Circuit in Operating Engineers Local 3 v.
Burroughs."5 There a union member, alleging irregularities in the local
union election procedure, secured two restraining orders against the
opening of the ballot box after an election. Subsequently the member
was found guilty of violating the union constitution, which required
members to resort to intra-union remedies for four months before bring-
ing court actions. He was fined, and on appeal within the union the
punishment was affirmed. The union member had then sought to re-
strain enforcement of the penalty in federal district court." The case
came before the Ninth Circuit on the union's appeal of the district court
decision in favor of the union member. 57
The court of appeals, after quoting the interpretation given to the
exhaustion proviso by the Supreme Court in Marine Workers, agreed
that the proviso was not a grant of authority to unions and, conse-
quently, did not authorize union discipline.5 It is interesting to note,
however, that the court then considered whether the remainder of sec-
tion 101 (a)(4) permitted discipline by the union. The court, emphasizing
the precious nature of the right to sue, concluded that it did not."
Although the Roberts, Ryan, Marine Workers, and Burroughs
decisions would appear to have firmly established the rule prohibiting
union discipline of members who fail to exhaust union remedies, the
district court decision in Buresch v. IBEW Local 240 demonstrates that
such is not the case. In Buresch a union member was fined and expelled
after being found guilty of violating a provision of the union constitution
quite similar to that involved in Burroughs. Alleging, inter alia, that he
had been denied due process by the union, and asking to be reinstated,
the member filed suit in federal district court. The court held that the
member was not denied due process during the union disciplinary pro-
ceedings and granted the union's motion for summary judgment.' In so
doing, the court impliedly affirmed the validity of the punishment im-
posed by the union.
55. 417 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1969) (2-1 decision), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 916 (1970).
56. See 417 F.2d at 371.
57. Id. at 371-72.
58. See id. at 372.
59. Id. at 372-73.
60. 343 F. Supp. 183 (D. Md. 1971), aff'd mem., 460 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1972).
61. 343 F. Supp. at 193.
[Vol. 26:519
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III. THE DISCRETIONARY NATURE OF THE EXHAUSTION
REQUIREMENT
Although some early district court cases indicated that the exhaus-
tion requirement was absolute 2-that courts and administrative agen-
cies were required in every case to dismiss actions brought before four
months had been spent exhausting intra-union remedies-today it is
well established that the requirement is discretionary. In Simmons v.
Textile Workers, A visco, Local 713,63 for example, the Fourth Circuit
considered the case of a union member who had been suspended for
failure to cooperate in the union's investigation of election irregularities.
The member, asking to be reinstated and claiming damages, brought
suit in federal district court.64 After that court ruled in favor of the
member, the union appealed, alleging, inter alia, that the complaint
should have been dismissed because the member had failed to exhaust
available internal union remedies.65
The court of appeals first considered the nature of the exhaustion
requirement and held that the statute does "not make the exhaustion
of hearing procedures mandatory in all cases, but allows the courts in
their discretion to determine whether pursuit of such remedies is re-
quired." 6 Under the facts of the case, the court concluded that exhaus-
tion was not required.
The Simmons court's conclusion that the exhaustion requirement
is discretionary has been reaffirmed in many subsequent decisions.6"
Moreover, one notes that any rule that the requirement is mandatory
62. E.g., Durandetti v. Chrysler Corp., 195 F. Supp. 653, 656 (E.D. Mich. 1961); Smith v.
General Truck Drivers Local 467, 181 F. Supp. 14 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
63. 350 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1965).
64. See id. at 1015.
65. Id. at 1016.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1016-17. The union member had been punished for "noncooperation." Because
this offense was not specified in the union's constitution, the court concluded that the union lacked
authority to discipline the member on such grounds and held that the proceedings against him were
void. Id. at 1017. For a discussion of the voidness exception to the exhaustion requirement, see
notes 122-39 infra and accompanying text.
68. E.g., NLRB v. Marine Workers Local 22, 391 U.S. 418, 426, 428 (1968); Fulton Lodge
No. 2, IAM v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 1969) ("The subsection ...preserves the
discretionary exhaustion doctrine."); Foy v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 377 F.2d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 1967)
("[The proviso] allows the courts in their discretion to determine whether pursuit of such remedies
is required."); Semancik v. UMW, Dist. 5, 324 F. Supp. 1292, 1296 (W.D. Pa. 1971), affd, 466
F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1972) ("Exhaustion of internal remedies is a discretionary requirement, not a
mandatory one.").
1974]
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would contravene the language of the proviso that a "member may be
required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures."69 The discretionary
nature of the requirement is, in fact, now so firmly established that the
courts have delineated a set of exceptions to it which will be discussed
below.
A. Where Intra-Union Remedies Have in Fact Been Exhausted for
Four Months
The first exception to the exhaustion requirement is contained in
the proviso itself, that is, the stipulation that a member may not be
required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures exceeding a four-
month lapse of time.70 In Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists,7
the court read this restriction as "[a]n outside limit beyond which the
judiciary cannot extend the requirement of exhaustion. 17 2 A number of
courts have employed this interpretation to refute union arguments that
exhaustion should have been required.
In Eisman v. Joint Board of Clothing Workers," for instance, a
union member who had exhausted his internal remedies for four months
filed an action for damages against his union. The union argued that
the case should be dismissed because of the member's failure to comply
with the union constitution, which required that union members exhaust
all internal remedies before instituting any court action. The court,
however, held that the union constitution was subordinate to the man-
date of section 101 (a)(4) and, more specifically, to the command that
exhaustion could be required only for a period not exceeding four
months. 74 Consequently, a union member who had pursued intra-union
remedies for four months could not be required to delay filing a court
action in order to await a final union determination of whether he was
entitled to relief.75
A similar result was reached in Hart v. Carpenters Local 1292.76
There too the union moved to dismiss a complaint filed by a union
member because of his failure to exhaust union remedies. The union
argued that the member should not have filed suit before the interna-
69. LMRDA § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1970) (emphasis added).
70. See id.
71. 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961).
72. 286 F.2d at 78.
73. 82 L.R.R.M. 2117 (D. Md. 1972).
74. Id. at 2120.
75. Id.
76. 341 F. Supp. 1266 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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tional union had approved the trial committee's recommendation of
discipline. The court, however, held that by waiting four months for a
decision after he had filed his appeal, the member had fully met the
exhaustion requirement.77
A case which illustrates the strength of the courts' adherence to the
concept that exhaustion cannot be required beyond four months is
Giordani v. Upholsterers International Union.7 There the union offered
an aggrieved member three courses of appeal; while two of the alterna-
tives would have resulted in a speedy determination, the third would not
have. The union argued that because the member had chosen the slow-
est method "[h]e should be deemed deliberately to have by-passed the
statutory four-month limitation."" In rejecting this contention the court
of appeals stated that since the union had permitted resort to any one
of three reviewing bodies there was no reason to declare that the mem-
ber's "[p]reference for one over the other should entail a forfeiture of
his statutory right to bring an action in this forum after four months." 0
77. Id. at 1269. It is interesting to note that in Hart the union member was tried twice by
the union trial committee. The court's discussion of the exhaustion requirement noted above was
in relation to the first trial. Since it concluded that the requirement had been satisfied vis-a-vis
that trial, the court proceeded to consider the merits of the member's claim. Id.
The court did, however, accept the union's defense of failure to exhaust against the member's
attack on the validity of the second trial. The member had argued "[t]hat since his federal court
action with respect to the first trial was then pending before the court at the time of the second
trial, prior to which he had exhausted the four-month period, he was not also required to exhaust
union procedures at a second trial on the same charge." Id. at 1270 (footnote omitted). In rejecting
this argument the court emphasized the purposes of the exhaustion requirement and concluded that
"[tihere was no justification for short-circuiting the union procedures in the second trial simply
because an action was pending in this court pertaining only to the first trial." Id.
78. 403 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1968). But see Glasser v. American Federation of Musicians, 354
F. Supp. I, 4-6 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (dictum). The Glasser case involved a dispute between a member
of a musicians' union and his booking agent. The union bylaws provided that all such disputes
should be settled by arbitration. The member refused to participate in the arbitration proceedings
and, after the arbitrators found against him, brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the award.
Although the district court actually held that a previous state court decision operated as resjudicata
to bar the member's suit, Id. at 4, in dictum it interpreted the four-month limitation in a manner
which appears contrary to the idea that four months is the maximum period of time for which
exhaustion of intra-union remedies can be required. Id. at 6. The member had argued that the union
requirement of arbitration was invalid under § 101(a)(4). Id. at 3. The court rejected the theory
that because the arbitration proceedings lasted longer than four months (by approximately fifteen
days) the four-month rule had been violated. It first noted that the member had done nothing to
intervene in or to expedite the arbitration proceedings. Furthermore, he had failed to initiate
available state court action. Finally, the court concluded that the member had in no way been
prejudiced by the fact that the proceedings lasted slightly more than four months. Id. at 6.
79. 403 F.2d at 88.
80. Id,
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B. Where There Is No Likelihood That a Decision Will Be Rendered
Within the Four-Month Period
In Harris v. Longshoremen's Local 1291,81 the plaintiffs, alleging
that the union "president's willful misconduct of union meetings [had]
deprived [them] of their right to participate effectively," 2 had filed suit
in federal district court.83 The lower court had granted summary judg-
ment for the union because of plaintiff's failure to seek relief within the
union8 On appeal the plaintiffs contended that resort to intra-union
remedies was not required "on the ground that a final decision may well
not have been obtainable within four months of the initiation of a pro-
ceeding. ' 8 The Third Circuit, however, concluded that this allegation
did not excuse the plaintiffs' failure to seek intra-union relief: "The
undisputed facts establish that, although there was no unqualified assur-
ance of a final decision within four months, the plaintiffs could reasona-
bly have expected to receive at least an initial decision within the speci-
fied period." 8 In the court's opinion this likelihood of an initial decision
was sufficient to require a four-month effort to exhaust union reme-
dies." By negative implication such an effort would not be required
where the plaintiff could show that there was no likelihood of any
decision within the statutory period.
The Harris court's interpretation of the exhaustion requirement
was followed in McKeon v. Highway Truck Drivers Local 107.8 In the
McKeon case, union members sought an order requiring the union to
hold an election,89 and the union argued that the members should be
81. 321 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1963).
82. Id. at 803. The plaintiffs alleged that this misconduct constituted a violation of
1101(a)(l)-(2) of the LMRDA. See id. at 803 n.1.
83. 210 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
84. Id. at 8.
85. 321 F.2d at 804. The members also argued that a multiplicity of appellate agencies
rendered the union's appeal procedure unreasonable. The court rejected this contention because
the union constitution did "not make successive resort to each of [the] agencies mandatory." Id.
86. Id. (footnote omitted).
87. Id. at 805. It should be noted that the Harris court did not recognize that the result would
be different where a union member could show that he would be barred by being required to seek
intra-union relief. See, e.g., Sewell v. Grand Lodge, IAM, 445 F.2d 545, 548-50 (5th Cir. 1971)
(action under LMRDA barred by state statute of limitations). It should be pointed out that at
another place in the opinion the court justified its holding requiring a four month pursuit of internal
remedies by stressing that here there was a "substantial likelihood that corrective action would be
forthcoming within the statutory period .... 321 F.2d at 806 (emphasis added). The court never
explained whether "substantial likelihood" or mere "likelihood" was the applicable standard.
88. 223 F. Supp. 341 (D. Del. 1963).
89. The members alleged that business agents and stewards were "officers" within the mean-
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required to exhaust internal remedies. To avoid the exhaustion require-
ment, the members maintained that the union procedures were unrea-
sonable because they involved multiple appellate agencies which met
infrequently. Relying on the Harris decision, the McKeon court refuted
this contention by noting that these alleged deficiencies were not "[s]o
unreasonable as to make some decision within the statutory four-month
period impossible."90
The Harris and McKeon decisions make it clear that failure to
resort to union remedies will not always be excused by the fact that all
intra-union remedies may not be exhausted within the four-month pe-
riod. In Harris the court stated that a reasonable expectation of "an
initial decision" within the time period was enough to demand that
union procedures be attempted." No "unqualified assurance of a final
decision" was required.12 And in McKeon the court implied that the
possibility of "some decision" was sufficient. 3 It should be noted,
however, that at least one court has incorrectly interpreted Harris as
excusing failure to utilize union procedure where it is not established
that a final disposition of the case can be accomplished by the union
within four months.
In Tirino v. Bartenders Local 164,11 members were to be tried by
the union trial committee for leading a wildcat strike. On the eve of the
trial, the members brought suit for a declaratory judgment and injunc-
tive relief. 5 The union moved for summary judgment partially" on the
ground that the members had failed to exhaust union remedies. The
court denied the motion as premised on this ground because there was
"no evidence to indicate that the plaintiffs [could] exhaust their intraun-
ion appellate remedies within four months . . . ."" Pursuant to the
Harris rule, however, the only question the Tirin court should have
ing of the LMRDA and thus were required to be elected. The local had filled these positions by
appointment. Id. at 342.
90. Id. at 345.
91. 321 F.2d at 804-05.
92. Id.
93. 223 F. Supp. at 345. See Carpenters Local 853 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 83
L.R.R.M. 2759, 2763 (D.N.J. 1972) (dictum).
94. 282 F. Supp. 809 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
95. The members alleged, inter alia, that the union charges against them were "unlawfully
unspecific" and that they could not obtain a fair hearing. Id. at 810-11.
96. The union based its motion for summary judgment on five different grounds. Id. at 812.
97. Id. at 816. The motion was, however, partially granted as to one plaintiff on a procedural
point not relevant to this discussion. See id. at 817-18.
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asked was whether the evidence indicated a likelihood that "at least an
initial decision" could have been rendered.98
C. Absence of an Available Remedy
Another exception to the exhaustion requirement had its origin in
the landmark Detroy"9 decision. In that case one reason given by the
court for not requiring exhaustion was the uncertainty that the union
rules "afforded the [union member] a remedy within the organiza-
tion."' 0 The court reasoned that "[o]nly resort to those [remedies] ex-
pressly provided in the union's constitution or those clearly called to his
attention by the union officials should be demanded . .1.0.1
A number of decisions have emphasized that the existence of an
available remedy must be established before a union's motion to dismiss
for a member's failure to exhaust will be granted. In Forline v. Helpers
Local 42,1"2 for example, the court denied such a motion, as founded on
failure to exhaust, 103 even though the facts alleged failed to show any
reason that would excuse the plaintiffs' failure to resort to internal union
processes. The court stressed that the union "should place before the
court facts establishing that union remedies are available to the plaintiff
and that plaintiff has neglected to use them." ' 4
98. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
99. Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 929 (1961). For the facts of this case, see text accompanying note 10 supra.
100. 286 F.2d at 80 ("[I]t is by no means clear that the union's own rules afforded the
appellant a remedy within the organization."). The court also relied on the existence of a clear
and undisputed violation of federal law and the fact that the member's injury was immediate and
difficult to compensate by a subsequent money award. Id. at 81.
101. Id. at 80-81. It should be pointed out that the Detroy court appeared to limit its
requirement of a certain remedy to those situations where a union member asserted a clear
violation of a federal statute. Id. at 80 ("When asserting what is clearly a violation of a federal
statute, a union member should not be required to first seek out remedies which are dubious.").
Other decisions, however, have not so limited the requirement. See notes 102-08 infra and accom-
panying text.
102. 211 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
103. The motion was granted on other grounds as to a portion of plaintiff's claim. Id. at
318.
104. Id. at 317 (emphasis in original). It should be noted, however, that the union's motion
was denied without prejudice to a renewal of the motion if and when a proper factual foundation
for such a motion were laid. Id. at 318; see Lavender v. UMW, 285 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. W. Va.
1968); cf. Adamczewski v. Local 1487, JAM, 84 L.R.R.M. 2791 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Burris v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C.. 1963). Burris involved a suit
brought by union members who alleged that they had been misled into accepting honorable with-
drawal cards from the union which led to their being blacklisted. Arguing that the former members
had failed to exhaust union remedies, the union moved to dismiss the complaint. The court held
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The absence of an available remedy has also been utilized on ap-
peals from decisions on the merits to justify excusing the exhaustion
requirement. In the Ninth Circuit case of Fruit Packers Local 760 v.
Morley,10 5 the court considered an action by union members to compel
the union and its secretary-treasurer to permit an examination of union
records. The union argued that the members had failed to exhaust intra-
union remedies. The court of appeals, however, held that the union
could not properly invoke the exhaustion doctrine because it had not
shown "that there was a procedure available to the members within the
union structure reasonably calculated to redress the particular grievance
complained of."'' 0 A similar result was reached in Steib v. Clerks Local
1497.107 There the Fifth Circuit, in an action by union members to enjoin
a dues check-off procedure, held that the members were relieved from
exhausting union remedies prior to bringing their action because the
union constitution failed to provide an appropriate internal remedy and
union officers had failed to bring any existing remedy to the attention
of the members.101
D. Futility of Exhaustion
There are instances where the union has procedures which theoreti-
cally could provide an aggrieved member an internal remedy but which
in reality would not produce the relief desired. In such cases exhaustion
that the question of whether or not the union had made provision for reasonable hearing procedures
with respect to the charge of wrongful issuance of withdrawal cards was one which could best be
answered at trial. Id. at 280. Furthermore, the court believed that a trial was necessary to determine
whether existing union remedies were open to ex-members out on withdrawal cards. Id.
105. 378 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1967).
106. Id. at 745. The court summarized, "Without any showing that there was some proce-
dure, neither uncertain nor futile, by which the [members] might have redressed the violation of
their statutory right to inspect union records, they cannot be barred from the courts for failure to
exhaust intraunion remedies." Id.
107. 436 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1971) (district court opinion adopted).
108. Id. at 1106; see Garrett v. Dorosh, 77 L.R.R.M. 2650 (E.D. Mich. 1971). In Garrett,
union members, claiming a violation of their right to nominate the candidate of their choice for
unit president, brought suit to nullify the nomination and to enjoin the election. Although the court
did not expressly use the phrase "absence of an available remedy," it is clear that it concluded
that there was no intraunion remedy which could have aided the plaintiffs. The court noted that
the first available appeal did not commence until after the election. Furthermore, subsequent
appeals could have consumed much of the president's term of office, during which "the very person
charged with the improprieties, by virtue of the fact that he [was] presently unopposed for Presi-
dent," would serve. Id. at 2653. The court concluded that to force the members "[t]o pursue such
a long appellate procedure would, in effect, deny them the relief they [sought] regardless of the
merits of their claim." Id.
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of intra-union remedies would be futile and the courts will not require
it. In Fulton Lodge No. 2, 1AM v. Nix," 9 for example, a union member
was expelled for circulating allegedly false and malicious statements
about the president of the local union. The court concluded that the
member was not required to attempt to exhaust his internal union reme-
dies because of the "continuing difficulties" between the member and
both of the reviewing authorities to which he would have had to make
his appeal.11°
Other courts have found "futility" by emphasizing factors other
than the prejudice of the review authorities against the aggrieved mem-
ber. In Farowitz v. Musicians Local 802,111 a member brought suit to
nullify his expulsion from the union for publishing a bulletin advising
union members not to pay certain union taxes. In rejecting the union's
argument that the member's action was barred by his failure to appeal
to the union's executive board, the court advanced a number of reasons
to support its conclusion that exhaustion was not required in this in-
stance because it would have been futile. First of all, members of the
board had a personal interest in the result of the litigation because
"[a]ny lessening of union revenues might have its most immediate effect
on the number and salaries of union executives."112 Furthermore, the
legality of the union tax had been challenged numerous times in the past.
The court pointed out that in view of this fact, "it would not be surpris-
ing if a harried Executive Board had developed a hardened position
toward critics of taxes. 113
109. 415 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1969).
110. Id. at 216. Earlier the court had characterized the relationship between the member and
the review authorities as "industrial warfare." Id. at 214. The court did not expressly state that
exhaustion would have been futile, but it clearly implied that this was its rationale for excusing
exhaustion. Id. at 216.
111. 241 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
112. Id. at 907. The Farowitz court, like the Fulton Lodge court, relied on the prejudice of
the review authority. In Farowitz, the court stressed that the union member was regarded as an
"exceptional" threat to the union, that one of the members of the executive board had an "intense
personal dislike" for the union member, and that the member had been treated quite severely in
the past when brought up on charges. Id.
113. Id. at 907-08. A similar rationale had been offered by the district court in an earlier
decision which had granted the member a preliminary injunction and which was affirmed in
Farowitz v. Musicians Local 802, 330 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1964). There the circuit court noted that
the executive board of the union had consistently taken a position on the tax issue contrary to that
advocated by the member. Id. at 1003. Although the court believed that one could not necessarily
equate the board's position on this point to the view it would have taken on the propriety of the
member's expulsion, it still could not conclude that the district court had abused its discretion in
deciding "[t]hat the likelihood of futility was so great that preliminary relief ought not to be
withheld." Id.
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A "hardened position" by the union appellate body has been
stressed in numerous other decisions where the courts have concluded
that it would have been futile for the member to pursue union remedies.
In Adamczewski v. Local 1487, 1AM,114 union members brought suit to
enjoin union discipline against them for crossing a picket line. The court
concluded that there was good reason to believe that exhaustion would
be futile because of sanctions already imposed on other union members
who had crossed the picket lines.115 A similar rationale was utilized by
the court in Parish v. Legion."' The action there was brought by plain-
tiffs on behalf of themselves and all other "travelers" (persons belonging
to one local and working in the jurisdiction of another),1 7 seeking a
declaratory judgment that they were members of the local in whose
jurisdiction they were working. Before filing suit, the travelers had com-
plained to the district international vice-president, who made a strong
recommendation that the local accept them into membership. However,
because of repeated holdings of the international convention that the
admission of travelers was a matter of local autonomy, he did not order
compliance with his recommendation. The court believed that this justi-
fied the travelers' conclusion "that the most they could expect from
higher Union authority was a similar recommendation and that a fur-
ther appeal within the Union would be futile.""'
The Fulton Lodge, Farowitz, Adamczewski, and Parish decisions
demonstrate that the futility aigument has often been employed success-
fully by members to counter union arguments that intra-union remedies
should have been exhausted. One should not be misled, however, into
assuming that the futility argument will invariably be accepted by the
courts, for there are numerous cases in which the courts have found that
there was an insufficient showing of futility." 9 Furthermore, it should
be noted that several decisions have held that a mere allegation of
futility will not suffice to excuse failure to resort to internal union
procedures.'1° Finally, a possible obstacle to the success of the futility
114. 84 L.R.R.M. 2791 (N.D. I11. 1972).
115. Id. at 2793.
116. 450 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1971).
117. Id. at 823 n.2.
118. Id. at 827.
119. E.g., Buzzard v. Local 1040, TAM, 480 F.2d 35, 41 (9th Cir. 1973); Hayes v. IBEW,
Local 481, 83 L.R.R.M. 2647, 2650 (S.D. Ind. 1973) (dictum).
120. E.g., Moore v. North American Rockwell, 80 L.R.R.M. 2172 (E.D. Mich. 1972); see
Fulsom v. United-Buckingham Freight Lines, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 135 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Carpenters
Local 1219 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 314 F. Supp. 148 (D. Me. 1970); cf Transport Workers
Union v. American Airlines, Inc., 413 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1969) (Railway Labor Act case). In
1974]
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argument is the position of some courts that allegations of futility are
premature where no attempt has been made to exhaust union reme-
dies."' The validity of this argument is questionable, for it seems sense-
less to require a union member to attempt union remedies in instances
where he can adduce sufficient facts to establish futility. Nonetheless,
union members filing suit in jurisdictions following this rationale should
take steps to exhaust even "futile" union remedies.
E. Voidness or a Clear Violation of Federal Law
In Libutti v. Di Brizzi,'2 the Second Circuit enunciated what has
become an extremely significant exception to the exhaustion require-
ment. In the Libutti case, union members, alleging that the union's
executive board had imposed restrictions on eligibility for union office
which violated the union's constitution and bylaws, were granted a re-
straining order by the district court.'3 On appeal the union argued that
the members had failed to exhaust union remedies. The Second Circuit,
however, held that exhaustion was not required because the union action
complained of was "void" t in that it violated the fundamental right of
union members to nominate candidates for union office. 25
Two important facts should be noted concerning the Libutti deci-
sion. The first is the reasoning supporting the voidness exception, that
is, that when the union action is void, "the reasons for requiring exhaus-
tion are absent .... ,,"2 The policies underlying the exhaustion require-
ment were enumerated in the Detroy'2 decision: (1) "to stimulate labor
organizations to take the initiative and independently to establish honest
and democratic procedures;" (2) to conserve judicial resources; and (3)
to ensure the valuable assistance which the courts would receive from
"prior consideration of the issues by appellate union tribunals.' '2  In
Transport Workers the court stated that if "mere conclusionary language in a complaint" were
sufficient to establish futility, "[t]he doctrine of exhaustion would be dissipated by mere form and
the door to the courts could be opened by prediction rather than by jurisdictional fact." Id. at 751.
121. E.g., Fulsom v. United-Buckingham Freight Lines, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 135 (W.D. Mo.
1970); McKeon v. Highway Truck Drivers Local 107, 223 F. Supp. 341 (D. Del. 1963).
122. 337 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1964), opinion adhered to on rehearing, 343 F.2d 460 (2d Cir.
1965).
123. 233 F. Supp. 924 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
124. 337 F.2d at 219.
125. See LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1970).
126. 337 F.2d at 219.
127. Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 929 (1961).
128. 286 F.2d at 79.
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instances where a member's rights are seriously violated, concluded the
Libutti court, none of the above policies are applicable: "[T]he commit-
ment of judicial resources is not great; the risk of misconstruing proce-
dures unfamiliar to the court is slight; a sufficient remedy given by the
union tribunal would have to approximate that offered by the court."'2 9
The second important facet of the Libutti decision is that the court
specifically cautioned against "indiscriminate application"' 3 ° of the
voidness exception. Since the concept of voidness is so closely connected
to the merits of the claim, the court believed that its indiscriminate use
"[c]ould reduce the exhaustion requirement to the tautology that a
plaintiff can find present relief in the courts only if his claim has legal
merit." 3'
Since Libutti, numerous courts have utilized the voidness exception
to justify the conclusion that exhaustion was not required. In Simmons
v. Textile Workers, Avisco, Local 713,132 a union member brought suit
for restoration to union membership after he had been suspended for
"non-cooperation,"'' 3 an offense not specified in the union's constitu-
tion. 34 The court held that discipline for an offense not set forth in the
union's constitution or bylaws was void; thus exhaustion should not be
required.' 3 ' Sheridan v. Liquor Salesmen's Local 2"3 involved an ac-
tion brought by union members to enjoin union discipline against them
for publishing an article criticizing shop stewards. Finding a clear viola-
tion of the members' section 101 (a)(2) right to free speech,3 7 the court
held that exhaustion was not required. 38 Finally, in Eisman v. Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers,"' the court held that exhaustion was not
required because the members had been expelled from the union without
the due process guaranteed by LMRDA section 101(a)(5).
129. 337 F.2d at 219.
130. Id.
131. Id. The court noted, however, that this danger "is [not] an inevitable result of applying
the exception." Id.
132. 350 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1965).
133. See text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.
134. 350 F.2d at 1017.
135. Id. at 1016-17; cf Boilermakers Local 455 v. Terry, 398 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1968).
136. 303 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
137. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(2) (1970).
138. 303 F. Supp. at 1005; see Archibald v. Operating Eng'rs Local 57, 276 F. Supp. 326
(D.R.I. 1967).
139. 352 F. Supp. 429 (D. Md. 1972).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The decisions interpreting section 101 (a)(4) of the LMRDA have
demonstrated an awareness of the inherent tension that pervades the
entire Act, that is, the conflict between the view of the Act as a means
of guaranteeing a more active role for the worker in his industrial
community and the concept of the importance of preventing unwar-
ranted governmental interference with internal union affairs.
Unjustified governmental intrusion is precluded by the now well
established rule that the exhaustion proviso applies to the courts rather
than to the unions themselves. The courts have not hesitated to invoke
the proviso in order to dismiss actions filed before the statutory period
has elapsed. Such dismissals, by preventing governmental interference,
stimulate unions to establish fair internal procedures, conserve judicial
resources, and provide valuable assistance to the courts by allowing
union tribunals to construe unfamiliar procedures.
Existing case law also promotes the Act's goal of assuring democ-
racy in internal union affairs. The majority rule prohibiting union disci-
pline of members who fail to attempt intra-union remedies ensures that
members will not be deterred from exercising their section 101(a)(4)
right to sue. Furthermore, the various exceptions to the exhaustion
requiremeit establish even more extensive protection for this important
right. The exceptions in cases where union procedures have in fact been
exhausted for four months and where there is no likelihood that any
decision will be rendered within the four-month period are simply affir-
mations of the exclusion contained in the statute itself. The exceptions
of absence of an available remedy and futility are essential because of
the inequities which would result if aggrieved members were forced to
resort to nonexistent remedies or to remedies which could not provide
the relief sought. Finally, the voidness exception is justified by the in-
applicability of the policies underlying the exhaustion requirement to
situations where the union action complained of is void.
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